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Abstract
Newspapers’ advertising revenues have declined sharply in recent decades. We build a
model to investigate the consequences on newspapers’ content and prices of a reduction
in advertisers’ willingness to pay. Newspapers choose the size of their newsroom, and
readers are heterogeneous in the relative amount of journalistic-intensive content they
prefer. We show that a reduction in advertising revenues lowers newspapers’ incentives to
produce journalistic-intensive content, which affects the composition of their readership.
We also build a unique dataset on French newspapers between 1960 and 1974 and perform
a difference-in-differences analysis using a “quasi-natural experiment”: the introduction
of advertising on television, which affected national newspapers more severely than local
ones. We find robust evidence of a decrease in both the amount of journalistic-intensive
content produced and the subscription price, which may help rationalize current industry
trends. We also provide evidence that national newspapers’ readership became less edu-
cated and aﬄuent following the change in prices and content.
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1 Introduction
As legacy newspaper companies have steadily decreased their employment of journalists in
recent years, there is growing concern about the industry’s ability to produce high-quality
information in the face of smaller newsrooms, fewer investigative reporters, and increased
reliance on wire services (see e.g. Henry, 2007; Starkman, 2013; Hamilton, 2016).
In the United States, for example, the average number of journalists per newspaper de-
creased sharply from 39 in 2001 to 23.5 in 2015.1 Meanwhile, US newspaper advertising
revenues have shrunk from nearly $50 billion in 2000 to less than $20 billion today, and the
advertising share in total revenues has declined from 82% to 65%.2 Of course, with the rise
of the Internet, these trends – illustrated in Figure 1 – have transpired amidst a backdrop
of rapid technological change in the ways journalists and individuals produce and consume
news.3
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Yet while there is broad agreement that the newspaper industry is in a state of economic
turmoil, the precise causes remain contested. For instance, it has been argued that the In-
ternet decreased newspapers’ advertising revenues, which may directly have caused journalist
jobs to dry up. But a third factor, such as changing consumer preferences, may be responsible
for driving both trends. Similarly, the Internet may have enhanced journalists’ productivity,
rendering fewer of them necessary to produce content, while at the same time lowering ad-
vertisers’ willingness to pay for readers’ attention (e.g., because of the rise of alternative
advertising platforms such as search engines and social media, or greater consumer switching
behavior online4). Or, perhaps the main factor driving down both advertising revenues and
the size of newsrooms was the surge in competition made possible by the Internet. All of
these hypothesis are plausible, and they are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive.
In this paper, we shed light on this debate by analyzing the relationship between adver-
tising revenues and newspapers’ choices regarding the size of their newsroom, the quantity of
news to produce, and their pricing strategies. Specifically, we investigate the consequences of
a decline in advertisers’ willingness to pay for readers’ attention triggered by the arrival of an
1The total number of journalists has also decreased due to the exit of many publications. Unfortunately,
more recent data are unavailable since the decision in 2016 by the American Society of News Editors to no
longer collect information on the number of journalists employed.
2Total revenues have declined by 50% since 2000, driven both by the decrease in advertising revenues and
fall in the revenues from sales. Figure C.1 in the Online Appendix represents the evolution of newspaper
advertising revenues in the United States over the same period, as a share of GDP.
3E.g. according to new findings by Boczkowski et al. (2017), young users mainly consume news on social
media “incidentally”: rather than engaging with the news content, they no longer differentiate it from the rest
of the social and entertainment information.
4See e.g. Athey et al. (2013).
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alternative advertising platform, which does not produce journalistic content but allows the
targeting of individuals for advertising purposes (e.g., a search engine).
Inspired by the literature on two-sided markets, we build a model in which a monopoly
newspaper chooses not only the prices it charges to readers and advertisers, but also the size of
its newsroom. The novelty of our approach lies in our treatment of the newspaper’s content:
we let readers be heterogeneous in the relative amount of journalistic-intensive content they
prefer (some readers prefer more international coverage, others more “soft” news), and also
assume that producing more journalistic-intensive content increases costs (because it requires
a larger newsroom).56 This framework generates new insights regarding the relationship
between advertising revenues, the number of journalists, and the composition of readership.
In particular, it predicts that a drop in advertising revenues may cause a decline in the amount
of journalistic-intensive content produced, a decrease in reader prices, and a readjustment
towards a less aﬄuent readership.
We test the empirical predictions of the model using a rich new dataset on French daily
newspapers and French television built from historical records. This dataset contains annual
data on local and national newspapers between 1960 and 1974, as well as detailed information
on television content. In 1967, the French government announced it would relax longstanding
regulations that prohibited television advertising. We provide evidence that this reform can
be plausibly interpreted as an exogenous and negative shock to the advertising side of the
newspaper industry.
Our empirical analysis takes advantage of two historical facts. First, the policy change
allowed for only a few minutes of advertising per day. Second, although the advertising
revenues raised by the broadcasting agency were significant, they did not lead to an adjustment
in the quality of television content around 1967. Rather, the reform aimed both at keeping
the public broadcasting agency financially afloat and at introducing a new channel a few years
later. To substantiate this claim, we present evidence on television set ownership, the size of
the television broadcasting agency’s newsroom, the content of programming, and the number
and quality of television transmitters. Taken together, these two facts suggest it is likely that
the introduction of television advertising constituted a direct shock to the advertising side
of the newspaper industry and only an indirect shock to the reader side. Because television
advertising did not directly affect newspapers’ marginal costs or journalists’ productivity
either, our empirical setting constitutes a unique opportunity to isolate the consequences of
a decrease in newspapers’ advertising revenues on their choices regarding the size of their
5In the Appendix, we present a simplified duopoly version of the model.
6Formally, we model the newspaper’s content as both a “horizontal” attribute (in the sense that read-
ers are heterogeneous in their ideal content) and a “vertical” attribute (in the sense that producing more
journalistic-intensive content is more costly). In the Online Appendix, we construct an alternative model in
which journalistic content is a pure vertical attribute, that is, all readers are better off when the journalistic
content increases.
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newsroom, the amount of information to produce, and the prices they charge to both sides of
the market. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to use this “quasi-natural”
experiment.7
A key identifying assumption in our analysis is that the negative shock on advertising
revenues affected national daily newspapers more severely than local daily newspapers. We
provide evidence to support this assumption by studying the actual content of advertisements
broadcast on television and published in newspapers. National newspapers rely to a greater
extent on advertisements for brands, whose owners may also wish to advertise on television.
By contrast, advertisements in local newspapers tend to feature classified ads or promote
local establishments. Moreover, national ads provide a larger fraction of revenue for national
newspapers than for local ones. We thus use national newspapers as our treatment group and
local newspapers as our control group.
The empirical analysis employs a difference-in-differences design to compare the change in
advertising revenues of national daily newspapers to the change in advertising revenues of local
daily newspapers over the same period. We find the introduction of advertising on television
led to a 24% decrease in the advertising revenues of national newspapers compared to those of
local newspapers, and that national newspapers lowered their advertising price by 14 to 40%
(depending on the advertising price measure we use) relative to local newspapers. We next
show the drop in advertising revenues propagated to the reader-side of the newspaper market.
The number of journalists employed by national newspapers decreased by 21% compared to
that of local newspapers, but the amount of space dedicated to news (any content other than
advertising) – the so-called “newshole” – remained unchanged. These two findings suggest
that – relative to local newspapers – national newspapers reacted to the drop in advertising
revenues by producing less journalistic-intensive content. To the extent that the size of the
newsroom is a good proxy for news quality, (see, e.g., Hamilton, 2004; Berry and Waldfogel,
2010; Fan, 2013; Cage´, 2017; Cage´ et al., 2017), our results highlight a positive relationship
between advertising revenues and quality of information. Also, we study the front page
content of a sub-sample of newspapers and find suggestive evidence that national newspapers
decreased their provision of hard news following the introduction of television advertising.
We also show that national newspapers decreased their subscription price by 11% com-
pared to local newspapers (but not their newsstand price, which remained stable). Overall,
the decrease in the subscription price increased the share of subscribers by 23% and left the
total number of daily units sold unchanged.8 Finally, we study the composition of readership
7Relatedly, Seamans and Zhu (2014) exploit an empirical setting (the entry of Craigslist) which enables
them to isolate the consequences of a negative shock to newspapers’ advertising revenues on the latter’s pricing
and content.
8The absence of change in the total number of daily units sold may in part be due to the adoption of a
more subscriber-based readership, which mechanically raises this reported number. By the same logic, the
actual number of distinct daily readers may have decreased in case subscribers are less likely to read an issue
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on a sub-sample of newspapers, and provide suggestive evidence that national newspapers’
readership became less educated and less aﬄuent following the decrease in subscription prices
and change in content.
We interpret these results in light of our model’s predictions. In the theoretical setting,
a newspaper can increase its readership not only by lowering its price, but also by hiring
additional journalists. The latter raises the demand from readers because a more journalistic-
intensive content attracts readers who are relatively less price-sensitive. When advertisers’
willingness to pay for readers’ attention declines, newspapers have lower incentives to attract
a large readership and they thus decrease the size of the newsroom in order to save on costs.
The consequent reduction in journalistic content, in turn, leads to a more price-elastic demand
from readers, which pushes the subscription price downwards.9
In an extension, we let the newspaper sell both subscriptions and individual issues. We
show the newspaper has incentives to sell subscriptions in order to engage in second-degree
price discrimination. The model predicts that a decline in advertising revenues increases the
extent of price discrimination, measured by the difference between the newsstand/unit price
and the average subscription price. This result may rationalize our empirical finding whereby
national newspapers decreased their subscription price without modifying their newsstand
price, relative to local newspapers.10
Our findings have implications for the modern media industry and inform ongoing debates
about the quality of 21st-century journalism. In particular, our analysis highlights that a
decrease in advertisers’ willingness to pay for readers’ attention – whatever its causes – may
reduce a media company’s incentives to invest in news quality. If advertising revenues continue
to decline in the Internet era, as many observers deem likely, our model suggests the quality of
information at the media outlet level will decrease as well.11 While these predictions may be
concerning, we advise caution in drawing strong welfare implications. Indeed, many factors
that tend to decrease advertising revenues, such as digitization, changes in reader habits, or
enhanced journalists’ productivity, also tend to reduce the media industry’s barriers to entry.
delivered to their doorstep compared to occasional readers who make newsstand purchases.
9Note that the decrease in the subscription price occurs despite the “waterbed effect.” The waterbed effect
embodies the two-sided market phenomenon mentioned by Rysman (2009) whereby changes in fundamentals
(in our case, a decrease in marginal advertisers’ willingness to pay) that lead prices to decrease on one side
of the market often lead prices to increase on the other side of the market. See also Godes et al. (2009),
Hagiu (2009), and Seamans and Zhu (2014). This phenomenon is related to the “see-saw effect” also specific
to two-sided markets (see, e.g. Peitz and Valletti, 2008; Anderson and Peitz, 2015).
10Anecdotal evidence suggests that the difference between the newsstand/unit price and the average sub-
scription price (the “price gap”) has increased in recent years. Although straightforward changes in marginal
costs and preferences (readers’ or advertisers’) could, in principle, explain this trend, our rationale points to a
causal relationship between advertising revenues and the scope for price discrimination.
11Athey et al. (2013) explore the extent to which the changes in readers’ habits triggered by the Internet
explain the recent collapse in advertising revenues. Similarly, Gentzkow (2014) investigates how the Internet
has reduced the advertising revenues of news outlets.
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Literature review Our analysis builds on the theoretical literature on two-sided markets
(Caillaud and Jullien, 2001, 2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Armstrong, 2006; Weyl,
2010). A strand of this literature has modeled media markets to analyze the relationship
between advertising revenues and the extent of “horizontal” differentiation in the market
(e.g., ideological or content diversity) or audience targeting (Gabszewicz et al., 2001, 2004;
Gal-Or and Dukes, 2003; Stro¨mberg, 2004; Anderson and Coate, 2005; Armstrong and Wright,
2007; Peitz and Valletti, 2008; Crampes et al., 2009; Esther Gal-Or et al., 2012). Another
strand of the literature investigates the relationship between media’s quality choices and their
reliance on advertising revenues. In these models, quality is a “vertical” attribute (see e.g.
Spence, 1975): all readers agree on what constitutes an improvement in content. In this
vein, Armstrong (2005) builds a duopoly model of the TV industry to investigate the level
of quality provided under two alternative funding mechanisms (advertising-only revenues vs.
both advertising and subscriptions revenues).12
In our benchmark model, the newspaper chooses the quantity of journalistic-intensive
content to produce. Journalistic content combines features of both horizontal and vertical
attributes: readers are heterogeneous in the amount of journalistic-intensive content they
prefer, and producing more journalistic content raises the newspaper’s costs (e.g., because it
requires a larger newsroom). In the Online Appendix, we provide an alternative model in
which the newspaper chooses the quality of its content and formulate predictions regarding
the relationship between quality and advertising. These predictions are consistent with those
of the benchmark model.
A recent strand of literature studies the relationship between media bias and advertising
revenues. In these models, readers dislike media bias and a reduction in bias can thus be
interpreted as an increase in quality (e.g. Gentzkow et al., 2006). In Ellman and Germano
(2009), for instance, increases in advertising revenues intensify newspaper competition for
readers, thereby increasing accurate reporting. In Petrova (2012), increases in advertising
revenues can either increase or decrease media bias depending on market conditions and
characteristics of interest groups.
Our paper is also related to the empirical literature on two-sided markets. For instance,
Rysman (2004) analyzes the market for yellow pages and Jin and Rysman (2015) study US
sports card conventions. Using data from the German magazine industry, Kaiser and Wright
(2006) and Kaiser and Song (2009) find evidence of network effects, and Song (2015) shows
readers are charged below marginal cost.13 Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) assess the ex-
tent of marker power in the Italian national newspaper industry. Using data on the Canadian
12Interestingly, Armstrong (2005) argues that relaxing existing caps on the number of advertising minutes
per day may lead to higher quality. According to his logic, such a policy would give TV channels higher
incentives to attract readers with high-quality programs.
13Song (2015) also finds that greater market concentration has an ambiguous impact on prices.
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newspaper industry, Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) find greater market concentration
does not imply higher reader or advertising prices. Fan (2013) structurally estimates a model
of competition between newspapers using US data and finds that greater market concentra-
tion increases subscription prices. Seamans and Zhu (2014) analyze the impact of the entry
of Craigslist on local US newspapers, and find that newspapers reacted by increasing their
subscription price (as predicted by the standard waterbed effect), decreasing their classified
ad rates, and decreasing their advertising rate (due to lower circulation). Similarly to ours,
their empirical setting allows them to study the consequences of a negative shock that affects
one side of a multi-sided market.14 By contrast, we find newspapers react to the introduction
of advertising on French television by decreasing their subscription prices, a finding seemingly
contradictory with the “waterbed effect”.15 However, we also find newspapers react by lower-
ing their quality, which we argue can rationalize a decrease in subscription prices.16 Indeed,
in our model, subscription prices can either increase or decrease depending on the extent to
which readers are sensitivity to quality. This result is consistent with new evidence by Shiller
et al. (2017) who show that the use of ad blocking leads to a decrease in websites’ quality.
Finally, our paper is a contribution to the empirical literature that uses historical data
to study the newspaper industry and its impact on society. Gentzkow et al. (2006) show
that the increase in the size of the newspaper market occurring between 1870 and 1920
increased newspaper competition and generally led to better information at the outlet level.
Further, Petrova (2011) studies the US newspaper market between 1880 and 1885 to show
that the then increasing advertising market promoted editorial independence from political
influences. Using data on US daily newspapers from 1869 to 2004, Gentzkow et al. (2011) find
the entry of the first newspaper in a county has a positive effect on political participation.
Using French data, Cage´ (2017) obtains a negative effect of competition (the entry of the
second or third newspaper in the market) on political participation, due to a decrease in the
quality of news. Further, exploiting data on the US newspaper industry from the early 20th
century, Gentzkow et al. (2014) estimate a model of demand, entry, and choice of ideology,
in which newspapers compete to attract readers and advertisers. They show that newspapers
differentiate themselves through ideology, and that readers prefer news that are congruent
with their own opinions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a two-sided model
of the newspaper industry. Section 3 introduces the new dataset we built for this study
14Also exploiting Craigslist’s entry, Kroft and Pope (2014) show that print newspapers react by decreasing
their quantity of advertising.
15Filistrucchi et al. (2012) study the consequences on private television channels of the 2009 partial ban on
advertising on French public television.
16Sun and Zhu (2013) analyze the relationship between the quality of blogs and advertising concerns. They
find bloggers exert more effort on content when motivated by advertising revenues.
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and provides descriptive statistics. In Section 4, we discuss the historical context of the
introduction of advertising on French television, and provide anecdotal evidence regarding
its impact on the newspaper industry. In Section 5, we estimate the relationship between
newspapers’ reliance on advertising revenues and their pricing and quality choices using a
difference-in-differences analysis based on the introduction of advertising on French television.
In Section 6, we interpret and discuss our results, and provide various robustness checks.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Theory section
We suppose a monopoly newspaper, a mass 1 of readers, and a mass 1 of advertisers exist.17
The advertisers’ willingness to pay for an advertisement in the newspaper increases with the
size of the readership. We assume readers are indifferent regarding the quantity of advertising
in the newspaper.18 The newspaper chooses not only the price pR charged to readers and
the price pA charged to advertisers, but also its content q ∈ [0, 1], where q can be interpreted
as the share of original, investigative journalism vs. commodity or plain vanilla news, or the
share of hard news vs. soft news. Producing higher content q requires hiring more journalists
and thus increases costs (see e.g. Jones, 2010; Hamilton, 2016). In the model, there thus exists
a one-to-one relationship between size of the newsroom and choice of content.19
Although presumably a higher q has positive spillover effects on society – for instance,
because investigative journalism leads to improved political accountability (Starkman, 2013;
Hamilton, 2016) – the choice whether to model a newspaper’s share of hard news as a “hor-
izontal” or a “vertical” attribute is not obvious. In our model, readers are heterogeneous in
their ideal content. Some readers are deterred from buying a newspaper that covers too few
international stories, while others prefer more entertaining news. At the same time, however,
we suppose that producing a higher q raises the newspaper’s costs (because it requires a larger
newsroom). In the Online Appendix, we provide an alternative setting in which q is a pure
vertical attribute (i.e., quality) and show that our main predictions hold.
Finally, we also assume that readers with a stronger taste for journalistic-intensive content
exhibit a higher willingness to pay; for instance, because interest in international or financial
news tends to be positively correlated with education and income (see e.g. Pew Research
Center, 2012, for empirical support). An implication of this assumption will be that the
17In the Appendix, we present a simple duopoly version of the model.
18We ignore externalities from advertisers to readers to focus squarely on the role played by the newspaper’s
choice of content. Assuming readers care about advertisements complicates the analysis and may generate
a multiplicity of equilibria. On this issue, see the discussions and techniques in Caillaud and Jullien (2003),
Armstrong (2006), Weyl (2010), Filistrucchi and Klein (2013), and White and Weyl (2016).
19We emphasize the relationship between the size of the newsroom (an input) and the produced content
(an output) because measuring quality, or distinguishing hard from soft news, is an inherently subjective and
contentious empirical exercise. In the empirical section, we thus use the number of journalists as a proxy for q.
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price-elasticity of readers’ demand is decreasing with q.
2.1 Set-up
Readers The payoff to reader i from purchasing the newspaper whose content is q is Ui =
 + xi − γ|q − xi| − pR, where xi determines both reader i’s ideal content and her highest
potential willingness to pay  + xi, that is, her willingness to pay when q exactly coincides
with her most preferred content. For simplicity, we assume xi is independently and uniformly
distributed on [0, 1] across readers. The dual role played by xi in readers’ payoff function is not
innocuous: it implies that readers with a higher taste for journalistic-intensive content also
exhibit a higher willingness to pay. The parameter  > 0 denotes readers’ content-independent
taste for the newspaper and γ > 0 captures readers’ sensitivity to the distance between q and
xi. We refer to γ as the readers’ sensitivity to q. We assume readers have a common outside
option equal to zero.
Advertisers The payoff to advertiser j from purchasing an ad is Vj = αd
R − pA, where dR
represents the fraction of readers who make a purchase (see below). The parameter α > 0
affects the advertisers’ willingness to pay for readers’ attention. Advertisers are heterogeneous
in their outside option: each advertiser j has an outside option vj uniformly and independently
distributed on [0, 1]. Notice we assume advertisers are indifferent about the composition of
readership; they only care about the number of readers.
The parameter α allows us to carry out comparative statics related to the newspaper’s
reliance on advertising revenues. In the spirit of our empirical setting, a decrease in α can
represent the arrival of a new advertising platform which does not affect readers willingness-
to-pay for the newspaper directly because it does not produce journalistic content.20
Newspaper The newspaper incurs a fixed cost equal to 12q
2. The newspaper also incurs
a marginal cost cR = 0 to serve readers and a marginal cost cA = 0 to serve advertisers.
The newspaper chooses the reader price pR, the advertising price pA, and the content q to
maximize profits:
Π
(
pR, pA, q
)
= pRdR
(
pR, q
)
+ pAdA
(
pR, pA, q
)− 1
2
q2, (1)
where dR
(
pR, q
)
and dA
(
pR, pA, q
)
represent the demand from readers and the demand from
advertisers, respectively.
20One could also model a change in the advertisers’ willingness to pay for newspaper readers through a
change in their outside option. This alternative approach yields qualitatively identical insights but complicates
expressions.
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Assumptions To ensure that the reader price pR is nonnegative and that the profit function
(1) is strictly concave in
(
pR, pA, q
)
, we assume
γ > max
[
1
4
(
2 + α2 +
√
20 + 4α2 + α4
)
,
1
2
(
α2 +
√
4 + α4
)]
. (2)
Notice (2) implies γ > 1. Moreover, to ensure neither side of the market is covered we impose
 ≤ 2γ
2−2−γ(2+α2)
1+3γ , where the right-hand side is positive given inequality (2).
21 To focus on
the case that generates the richest set of predictions, we suppose α <
√
2. The case in which
α ≥ √2 is almost identical and available upon request.
2.2 The newspaper’s problem
Demand from readers There exist two kinds of readers indifferent whether to purchase
the newspaper. The marginal reader to the right of q, denoted x˜r, is found by rearranging:
+ x˜r − γ (x˜r − q)− pR = 0, (3)
which yields x˜r =
−pR+γq
γ−1 . Notice x˜r shifts to the left as p
R increases and to the right as q
increases. Similarly, the marginal reader to the left of q, denoted x˜l, is found by rearranging:
+ x˜l − γ (q − x˜l)− pR = 0, (4)
which yields x˜l =
pR−+γq
γ+1 . Notice x˜l shifts to the right as either p
R or q increase.
The demand from readers is thus equal to
dR
(
pR, q
)
= x˜r − x˜l = γˆ
(
+ q − pR) , (5)
where γˆ = 2γ
γ2−1 . The demand is increasing in q and decreasing in p
R and the sensitivity
parameter γ. All else equal, choosing a higher q increases the overall demand from readers
because readers whose ideal content is close to 1 exhibit a higher willingness to pay. In other
words, the demand from readers becomes less price-elastic as q increases. The latter effect is
stronger the lower γ is, because the sensitivity of the average marginal reader 12 (x˜l + x˜r) to
changes in q is decreasing in γ.
Demand from advertisers Advertiser j purchases an advertisement if and only if Vj =
αγˆ
(
+ q − pR) − pA ≥ vj . It follows dA (pR, pA, q) = αγˆ (+ q − pR) − pA. The demand
for advertisements is increasing in dR and α, and decreasing in pA. Because the demand
21Formally, this inequality will imply that, at the optimum, there are some readers who do not make a
purchase because they find q to be too high and others that do not make a purchase because they find q to be
too low.
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from readers dR
(
pR, q
)
is increasing in q, choosing a higher q also raises the demand for
advertisements.
To summarize, the newspaper chooses pR, pA, and q to maximize its profits:
Π
(
pR, pA, q
)
= pRγˆ
(
+ q − pR)+ pA (αγˆ (+ q − pR)− pA)− 1
2
q2. (6)
The associated system of first-order conditions is given by
∂
∂pR
Π
(
pR, pA, q
)
= 0 ⇐⇒ 2pR = + q − αpA, (7)
∂
∂pA
Π
(
pR, pA, q
)
= 0 ⇐⇒ 2pA = αγˆ (+ q − pR) , (8)
∂
∂q
Π
(
pR, pA, q
)
= 0 ⇐⇒ q = γˆ (pR + αpA) . (9)
Solving the system of equations (7), (8), and (9) for pR, pA, and q yields the solution
to the newspaper’s problem, which we state in the next proposition together with the main
comparative statics of interest.
Proposition 1 It is optimal for the newspaper to set
pR =
γ2 − γα2 − 1
2γ2 − 2− (2 + α2) γ  p
A =
αγ
2γ2 − 2− (2 + α2) γ  q =
2γ
2γ2 − 2− (2 + α2) γ .
A decrease in α – that is, a decrease in the advertisers’ willingness to pay for readers’ attention
– (i) lowers the size of the newsroom q, (ii) lowers the price pA charged to advertisers, and
(iii) lowers the price pR charged to readers if and only if γ ≤ 1 +√2, that is, if and only if
the demand from readers is sufficiently sensitive to the choice of content.
Proof. See Appendix Section A.1. 
Not surprisingly, a decrease in the advertisers’ willingness to pay α lowers the price pA
the newspaper is able to charge advertisers. More interesting is the relationship between α
and both the choice of content q and the reader price pR.
A decrease in the advertisers’ willingness to pay for readers’ attention reduces the newspa-
per’s incentives to attract a large readership. Because the size of the readership is increasing
in q, it follows the newspaper has an incentive to downsize its newsroom and choose a lower
q – to save on costs – when advertising revenues decline.
Further, a decrease in α may either increase or decrease the price charged to readers. On
the one hand, holding the choice of content constant, a decline in the advertisers’ willingness to
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pay induces the newspaper to increase the price it charges readers. This result is the standard
“waterbed effect” whereby the newspaper has lower incentives to attract readers through low
prices when the marginal advertising revenues decrease.22 On the other hand, the decline in
q leads to a more price-elastic readership, which pushes the reader price downward. When γ
is low (i.e., γ ≤ 1 +√2), the average marginal reader is, in relative terms, very sensitive to
changes in q. As a result, a decrease in q leads to a relatively large contraction in the demand
from readers and a significant increase in the associated price-elasticity of demand. This last
change outweighs the waterbed effect and results in a lower pR. By contrast, when γ is high
(i.e., γ > 1 +
√
2), a decrease in q does not affect the demand from readers much and the
waterbed effect prevails: the reader price pR increases.
We conclude our analysis by commenting on the relationship between the newspaper’s
reliance on advertising revenues and the composition of its readership. The average reader’s
ideal content is given by:
xˆ :=
1
2
(x˜l + x˜r) =
+ γ2q − pR
γ2 − 1 =
2γ + 1
2γ2 − 2− (2 + α2) γ . (10)
Corollary 1 The average reader’s ideal content xˆ increases with the advertisers’ willingness
to pay for readers’ attention.
This result follows directly from equation (10). If one believes taste for higher journalistic-
intensive content to be positively correlated with income and education, our model suggests
that a decrease in advertising revenues may lead to a less aﬄuent and/or educated readership.
The intuition for this result is most clearly seen for the case in which γ ≤ 1 +√2. There, a
decrease in advertising revenues induces the newspaper to become cheaper and reduce the size
of its newsroom. These changes in pricing and content attract readers who were previously
deterred from the high reader price and/or the high share of journalistic-intensive content.
Empirical Predictions We end with a summary of the model’s main findings:
• Prediction 1: A decline in advertising revenues triggers a decrease in newspapers’
newsrooms and amount of journalistic-intensive content.
• Prediction 2: A decline in advertising revenues leads to a less aﬄuent and educated
readership.
2.3 Extensions
We briefly summarize the main findings of the three extensions provided in the Appendix and
Online Appendix.
22See Seamans and Zhu (2014) for empirical support.
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Duopoly In the Appendix, we present a simple duopoly version of the model. The news-
papers differentiate themselves, with one newspaper producing relatively little journalistic-
intensive content and the other producing a relatively large quantity of it. The newspaper
which produces the higher share of journalistic-intensive content is able to command a higher
price and enjoy larger profits. In this model, we confirm the main predictions of the monopoly
benchmark by showing that a decrease in advertising revenues lowers the average quantity of
journalistic-intensive content produced and consumed in the market, the average price charged
to readers, and the average reader’s taste for journalistic-intensive content.
Increases in competition The insights from the duopoly model allow us to conjecture
with some confidence the relationship between the magnitude of our main comparative statics
of interest and the number of newspapers present in the market. Formulating such conjectures
is useful in light of the empirical analysis below, where we compare outcomes in the national
newspaper market to outcomes in the arguably less competitive local newspaper market.23 To
begin with, starting with two newspapers, any further increase in the number of newspapers
lowers the average newspaper’s size of newsroom q because of increasingly severe business
stealing effects. The average fixed cost 12q
2 in the market decreases with the number of
newspapers, and thus also the marginal benefit of removing one journalist. As a result, the
higher the total number of newspapers, the lower the incentives to reduce costs by downsizing
newsrooms following a drop in advertising revenues. We thus expect decreases in journalistic
content of lower magnitude in more competitive markets. Because it is the reduction in
journalistic content that triggers a reduction in reader prices, it follows that decreases in
reader prices of lower magnitude should be expected in more competitive markets.24 Overall,
therefore, we conjecture that falls in advertising revenues that occur in more competitive
markets lead to changes in our main variables of lower magnitude.
Quality Provision In the Online Appendix, we model journalistic-intensive content as a
pure vertical attribute (i.e., quality). Quality then serves to attract readers, and the newspa-
per’s incentives to provide quality depend on advertisers’ preferences. We show that a decline
in advertising revenues leads to a decrease in the newspaper’s quality.
Price Discrimination In our dataset, the unit price charged to occasional readers is higher
than the average subscription price. Selling subscriptions is a means to engage in second-
degree price discrimination. Current industry trends include a widening gap between the
23Unfortunately, fully solving a model with more than two newspapers is intractable.
24This last effect is further strengthened by the observation that the average newspaper’s residual demand
becomes less price-elastic as the total number of newspapers increases, which occurs because each newspaper
caters to an increasingly small and captive niche.
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unit price and the average subscription price (the “price gap”).25 Although several factors
may induce newspapers to widen the price gap (e.g., changes in marginal costs, preferences,
etc), in the Online Appendix we investigate whether a drop in advertising revenues may
plausibly explain an increase in newspapers’ incentives to price discriminate. In the model,
readers are uncertain about their willingness to pay for future issues, and those who choose
to subscribe purchase a “bundle” of several issues before knowing their willingness to pay for
it.26 We provide conditions under which it is profit-maximizing to (i) induce readers with a
high expected willingness to pay to subscribe and (ii) charge the readers with a low expected
but high realized willingness to pay a high unit price. We show that lower advertising revenues
always increase the price gap, that is, the extent of price discrimination. We are then able to
formulate the following additional empirical prediction.27
• Prediction 3: A decline in advertising revenues increases the extent of second-degree
price discrimination, as measured by the difference between the unit price and the
average subscription price (the “price gap”).
3 Industry and data characteristics
In this section, we briefly introduce the new dataset we built for this study, and describe the
newspaper industry characteristics. We discuss further details of the construction of the data
in the Online Appendix Section B.
3.1 Newspaper industry characteristics
The French daily newspaper industry is divided into two segments: the local daily newspaper
industry (“Presse quotidienne re´gionale”, PQR) and the national daily newspaper industry
(“Presse quotidienne nationale”, PQN). National newspapers can be purchased in the en-
tire French territory. By contrast, the natural news market for a local daily newspaper is
a county.28 By and large, national newspapers have a much greater focus on international
events, financial news, and national politics than local newspapers. By contrast, local news-
papers tend to cover local politics and local events.29 Our period of interest (1960-1974) has
25Suggestive evidence for the US newspaper industry is available upon request.
26See Glazer and Hassin (1982) (whose models logic we incorporate in our framework) for a detailed discussion
on the scope for subscriptions to be used as a means to price discriminate between readers.
27Interpreting changes in the price gap as changes in the extent of price discrimination is valid in the DD
setting as long as the introduction of advertising on television did not affect other factors that may explain
part of the difference in prices (e.g., costs). See Clerides (2004) for a discussion regarding measures of price
discrimination.
28A county (“de´partement” in French) is a French administrative division. The median land area of a county
is 2,303 sq mi, which is slightly more than three-and-half times the median land area of a county in the United
States.
29Moreover, the use of wire stories by local newspapers is much less prevalent in France compared to the US.
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around 100 (national and local) daily general information newspapers.
Fourteen national newspapers exist at the beginning of the period, and twelve at the end.30
The total national newspaper circulation is stable during this time period, with around 4.2
million copies sold every day. The number of local newspapers during the same period varies
around 90, with a total circulation amounting to around 7.8 million copies (see Cage´ (2017)
for more details on the historical evolution of the French local daily newspapers industry).
On average, the circulation of national daily newspapers amounts to nearly 300, 000 copies a
day, whereas the circulation of local daily newspapers amounts to 100, 000. Also, there were
on average 3.1 newspapers circulating in each French county from 1960 to 1974, so that both
the national newspaper market and the average local newspaper market are oligopolies.31
Copies are sold either at the newsstand to unit buyers or through subscription. The average
daily share of unit buyers is 73%. (Tables 1 and 2 respectively provide descriptive statistics
on newspaper prices, revenues, and the number of journalists, as well as on circulation and
newspaper content for the national daily newspaper industry and for the local daily newspaper
industry.)
[TABLES 1 & 2 HERE]
Overall, national daily newspapers generate e425 million32 in total revenues each year,
whereas local daily newspapers generate e145 million. Total revenues are the sum of sales/circulation
revenues and advertising revenues. On average, between 1960 and 1974, the share of advertis-
ing revenues in total revenues is 47%. The quantity of advertising in newspapers represents
around three pages per newspaper issue, that is, 19% of the content of the newspaper.
3.2 Data
We construct an annual balanced panel dataset on local and national newspapers in France
between 1960 and 1974. The data are paper data that we digitize and merge from various
historical sources.
Prices, circulation, and revenues We collect data on prices, revenues, and circulation
from the French Ministry of Information’s non-publicly available records in the National
30Libe´ration, Paris Presse, and Paris Jour exit the industry in 1964, 1970, and 1972, respectively. Libe´ration
– same title but entirely distinct newspaper from the aforementioned Libe´ration – enters the industry in 1973.
We chose not to include the “first” Libe´ration in the dataset, because it exits four years before the introduction
of advertising on television. For the same reason, we exclude the “second” Libe´ration. In Section 6.3, we show
our results are robust to dropping Paris Presse and Paris Jour.
31During the same time period, only two newspapers, La Nouvelle Re´publique Du Centre Ouest and Ouest
France, were consistently in a monopolistic situation in the county in which they were headquartered. This
was also the case for La De´peˆche du Midi, but only in 1960 and 1961; for La Montagne from 1966 to 1972; and
for L’Union beginning in 1967. Online Appendix Table D.10 shows that our results are robust to dropping the
newspapers that are in a monopolistic situation.
32Euros here are constant 2014 euros.
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archives. The Ministry of Information required newspapers to report annually their revenues
and prices. We collect data by having direct access to the responses to these queries.
We obtain information on the unit price, the subscription price – defined as the annual
subscription price divided by the total number of issues in the year –, the number of issues
per year, sales revenues and advertising revenues, as well as information on circulation with
the share of unit buyers and the share of subscribers. Our dataset includes data for 68
local newspapers, that is, a large fraction of the local daily newspapers industry. These
newspapers are the ones for which the data are available in the archives. Our sample of
national newspapers include all 12 national newspapers circulating between 1960 and 1974.
Number of journalists We use annual data on the number of journalists at the newspaper
level from the non-publicly available paper records of the “Commission de la carte d’identite´
des journalistes professionnels” (CCIJP), the organization that issues press cards to journal-
ists in France since 1936. These unique data are from Cage´ (2016). The CCIJP delivers press
cards to “any person whose primary, regular, and remunerated professional activity is associ-
ated with one or more daily or periodical publications or news agencies.” Importantly, media
companies are forbidden by law to employ a professional journalist who does not hold a press
card for a period exceeding three months. Finally, journalists must renew their press card
annually. Our dataset includes data for 63 out of the 68 local newspapers for which we have
revenue data, and 11 out of the 12 national newspapers. For each of these newspapers, we
know the number of journalists (including both monthly-paid salaried workers and freelancers)
on an annual basis as well as their compensation, i.e., their monthly gross salary. The number
of journalists is one of the variables we use to proxy for newspapers’ quality and/or quantity
of journalistic-intensive content. On average, newspapers employ 63 journalists during our
time period. Finally, we also collect information on the number of journalists working for
the French television and radio broadcasting agency (ORTF) for the years 1960, 1964, 1965,
1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, and 1974. Exactly as for newspaper journalists, television
journalists must hold a press card. We use this information as a proxy for television quality
below.
Advertising prices and quantity A change in advertising revenues can be driven by a
change in advertising prices and/or a change in advertising quantity. We collect data on both
the price and the quantity of advertising to disentangle the two effects.
A first source of information for advertising prices is the official list price per column inch
of advertising space. We digitize these data from “Tarif Media,” an annual publication that
provides information regarding advertising rates.33 “Tarif Media” provides information on a
33“Tarif Media” is the French equivalent of the SRDS Newspaper Advertising Source in the United States,
a source that has been used in a number of media studies (see e.g., Seamans and Zhu, 2014).
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menu of prices (specifically, prices vary depending on the page on which the ad is displayed).
In this analysis, we use the rate for front-page ads, which is the rate for which we have the
highest number of observations.34
A downside of using list prices is that discounts are common in the newspaper industry:
the listed price is not the actual transaction price, which is usually lower (see e.g., Chandra,
2009). Price lists are hence a relevant measure of advertising prices as long as we assume the
potential bias between list prices and actual prices does not differ too much across newspapers
and over time.
Given this caveat, we use another measure of advertising prices common in the literature,
which consists of the total advertising revenues divided by the newspaper circulation. The two
measures are strongly correlated (the correlation between them is equal to .5 and is significant
at the 1% level).
We collect data on the amount of advertising per issue directly from the paper version of
the newspapers available in the French National Library. For each year and each newspaper,
we study the content of the newspaper issues during two entire weeks (the third week of March
and the third week of December.)35 We measure the quantity of advertising on each page
(i.e., the share of the page’s surface devoted to ads), as well as the number of advertisements.
We thus have information on the total number of advertisements in the newspaper, and on
the share of the newspaper devoted to advertising (the advertising space).
For the year 1967, we go further and distinguish between national ads and local ads. Na-
tional ads are defined as advertisements for branded products or services. Local ads mainly
consist of classified ads and ads for local shops or events. We use this information to substan-
tiate our claim that national newspapers rely to a greater extent on national ads relative to
local newspapers. Finally, to provide anecdotal evidence on the substitution effect of televi-
sion, we collect information for a subset of newspapers (see below) on the category (e.g., food
and beverage, cars, household electrical goods, etc.) of each published advertisement.
Newshole The content data we collected also allows us to compute the newshole, i.e., the
amount of space dedicated to news (any content other than advertising). To investigate
changes in content, we also collect extra information for 37 local newspapers and all national
newspapers in our sample. For each of these newspapers and year, we compute the share of
hard news stories and the share of soft news stories on the front page of each issue for the
third week of March from 1964 to 1972.36
34We do so to maximize the number of observations in our sample; our results are robust to constructing an
average rate from the menu of prices and are available upon request.
35We chose the third week of March because it is the week the INSEE (the French national statistics agency)
selected to run its surveys, and the third week of December because Christmas is a suitable time for advertising.
36Following Cage´ (2017), the share of articles on hard news is defined as the number of articles on agriculture,
economics, education, environment, international affairs or politics, divided by the total number of articles we
are able to classify. The share of articles on soft news is defined as the number of articles on movies, culture,
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Readership data Finally, for a subset of the newspapers included in our sample, we obtain
information on readers’ characteristics. The data we exploit come from the Centre d’Etude
des Supports de Publicite´ (CESP), an association composed all the main companies active
in the advertising industry. The CESP has published a report on French newspaper readers
every five years between 1957 and 1967 and annually starting in 1968. The survey results
are available in paper format, and we digitized them for the following years: 1957, 1962,
1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1972, and 1974. Details regarding the methodology of the survey are
provided in the Online Appendix Section B.
4 Background on the introduction of advertising on French
television
We first discuss the historical background to the introduction of advertising on French televi-
sion (announced in 1967 and implemented in 1968), and then provide some anecdotal evidence
regarding the impact of the shock on both the advertising revenues of national newspapers
and the nature of the advertisements they published. We also show that this introduction did
not affect the quality of television content, nor the quantity of news it broadcast. We exploit
this feature in our empirical analysis to isolate the consequences of a shock that likely affected
in a direct way only the advertising side of the newspaper industry.
4.1 French television in the 1960’s
French Television was state-owned from 1945 to 1981.37 A national agency – the “Office de
Radiodiffusion-Te´le´vision Franc¸aise” (ORTF) – was in charge of providing radio and television
content.38 The agency was not-for-profit and funded by revenues from television license fees.
Only one channel (“La premie`re chaˆıne” – the “First Channel”) was available until 1963. A
second TV channel (“La deuxie`me chaˆıne” – the “Second Channel”) was introduced in 1964,
and a third one (“La troisie`me chaˆıne” – the “Third Channel”) in 1972. TV penetration
gradually increased during this period.39 In 1970, nearly 70% of French households owned
a television (Parasie, 2010). Channels were financed mostly through a tax (redevance) until
1968. By law, commercial or brand advertising was forbidden.40
leisure activities, sports, news in brief, religion or health, divided by the total number of articles we are able
to classify.
37During this period, all TV channels in the United States were privately-owned, whereas two TV channels
were state-owned (BBC 1 and BBC 2) and one was private (ITV) in the UK.
38The first national agency, the “Radiodiffusion Franc¸aise” (RDF), was created in 1945. It was renamed
“Radiodiffusion-Te´le´vision Franc¸aise” (RTF) in 1949 and replaced by the ORTF in 1964.
39See e.g. Online Appendix Figure C.3. While TV penetration is increasing at the time, it is important to
highlight that there is no change in this trend around the time of the shock.
40An exception is “collective advertising,” which promotes products, say, fruits, without mentioning a brand
(Duchet, 2005). They were not very important, however. In 1959, for example, the time devoted to collective
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The transition to color on the Second Channel and the need to produce an increasing
number of programs led the ORTF to experience severe financial difficulties – it was “on
the edge of the abyss” (Bellanger, 1969). The French government’s secret decision in March
1965 to introduce advertising on television was made public on October 20, 1967, thereby
provoking a strong controversy both in Parliament and within the newspaper industry. The
then-Prime Minister George Pompidou argued that the ORTF had no choice but to find new
sources of revenues to continue developing the Second Channel and eventually create a third
one. He also argued that enabling firms to advertise on television would “revitalize production
by giving [them] the possibility to develop their domestic market” (address in Parliament on
April 24, 1968).41 The first advertisement is broadcast in October 1968.
The content broadcast on television during our period of interest was almost exclusively
national (see e.g. Bourdon, 1990; Brochand, 1994; Ledos, 2007). We illustrate this lack of
local content with information obtained from the annual ORTF reports. Online Appendix
Figure C.2 shows the number of hours of local content broadcast on the 1st and on the 2nd
channels. This number is consistently lower than 25 hours per year for channel 1 and 16 hours
per year for channel 2. On either channel, local content never represented more than 2% of
total content (measured in hours).
A third channel was introduced in 1972. Contrary to the existing channels, the goal of
this new channel was to be a “regional” channel, precisely to compensate for the existing lack
of regional coverage. We show in Section 6.3 that our results are robust to focusing on the
1960-1971 period, i.e. before the introduction of the third channel.
4.2 A threat to newspapers?
Left-leaning political parties and the newspaper industry were firmly against the reform. The
Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left (“Fe´de´ration de la gauche de´mocrate et so-
cialiste”) – a conglomerate of French left-wing non-Communist forces – introduced various
bills to ban commercial advertising on television by arguing it would lead to a decrease in
the quality of television content. More importantly – and consistent with the identification
strategy we use in this paper – very much present is the idea that the reform would lead to a
decrease in newspaper advertising revenues.42 In fact, as early as 1964, the then-Minister of
Information, Alain Peyrefitte, was aware of this issue and claimed the introduction of adver-
advertising was only of five hours and 10 minutes per year (Parasie, 2010).
41Commercial advertising was allowed much earlier in almost all other developed countries: 1941 in the
United States, 1955 in the UK, 1956 in Germany, and 1957 in Italy and Spain (Parasie, 2010).
42The Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left argued the government wished to introduce adver-
tising on television so as to weaken newspapers, the only independent media industry (Parasie, 2010). In an
address to the Parliament on April 24, 1968, Jacques Chambaz (from the Communist Party) claimed that
“the introduction of commercial advertising on television is but a new way to deal a blow to the broadsheet
newspapers that you consider not docile and flexible enough.”
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tising on television would be worth considering only if the press could survive it (Bellanger,
1969).
Not surprisingly, newspapers were also against the reform. For instance, the Federation
and the Confederation of the French Press estimated in a report that the press would lose
between 40% and 50% of its advertising revenues, that is, between 20% and 40% of total
revenues depending on the newspaper.
4.3 A substitution effect on the advertising side of the market
The quantity of advertising broadcast on television during our period – as measured by the
number of minutes of advertising per day – is regulated and very low. The first commercial
advertisement was broadcast on French television in October 1968. The time devoted to
advertising was two minutes per day in 1968 – and only on the First Channel – four in
1969, eight in 1970 (i.e., 2,720 minutes per year; 1970 is also the year in which advertising is
introduced on the Second Channel), and more than 12 in 1971 (Bellanger, 1969). Such a low
daily quantity of advertising suggests the impact on television viewers likely was limited in
practice. Advertising revenues generated by the ORTF increased by e82.3 million between
1967 and 1968 (despite the broadcasting of less than 184 minutes of advertising in total), and
by e216 million between 1968 and 1969. In 1971, advertising revenues represented 22% of
the ORTF’s total revenues (Bellanger, 1969). The average revenue per minute of advertising
was around e0.45 million in 1968 and around e0.15 million in 1969. Thus, although the
limited quantity of advertising the reform introduced is unlikely to have significantly affected
the preferences of TV viewers and newspaper readers, it was manifestly sufficient to generate
large revenues for the ORTF. Below, we exploit this unique feature to isolate the consequences
of a decrease in newspapers’ advertising revenues on the size of their newsroom, their choice
of content, and their pricing. Also, the shock to the advertising market was significant and
immediate and, perhaps not surprisingly, it seems the first companies to advertise on television
were those with the largest willingness to pay for it (as suggested by the fall in the average
advertising revenue).
We first provide aggregate evidence at the industry level to give a sense of the magnitude
of the effect of the introduction of advertising on television on the advertising revenues of local
and national daily newspapers.43 Total advertising revenues of national daily newspapers de-
creased by e49.5 million between 1967 and 1968 (compared to the e82.3 million of additional
revenues raised by television over the same period). Note that national newspapers’ adver-
tising revenues decreased even though the total advertising market was rapidly expanding in
France between 1967 and 1974. By contrast, local newspaper advertising revenues increased
43In Section 5, we provide econometric evidence of this shock, computing difference-in-differences estimates
to show that this shock affected the advertising revenues of the national daily newspapers more severely than
the revenues of the local daily newspapers.
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during the same period (Figure 2). Moreover, the share of national daily newspapers in total
advertising revenues decreased from 14% in 1967 to 11% in 1974, as shown in Figure 3.
[FIGURES 2 & 3 HERE]
The introduction of advertising on television can be considered a significant negative shock
to the advertisers’ side of newspaper industry. However, its impact was heterogeneous in that
it affected national newspapers more severely than local newspapers. The reason behind this
heterogeneous effect lies in the distinct nature of the advertisements published in national and
local newspapers. National newspapers rely to a greater extent on advertisements for brands
(“national ads”), whose owners may also wish to advertise on television. By contrast, a large
share of advertisements in local newspapers is local in nature (local commercial advertisements
and classified advertisements).
4.3.1 Classifying advertisements
To provide anecdotal evidence regarding the impact of the introduction of advertising on
television on newspapers, we classify advertisements according to 25 categories (food and
beverage, cars, household electrical goods, etc.).
Television We collect data on all the advertisements broadcast on French television between
1968 and 1974 from the website of the Institut National de l’Audiovisuel (INA – National Au-
diovisual Institute). For each advertisement, we know the date of its first airing, its length,
and its category. Between 1968 and 1974, 7,337 different advertisements were broadcast on
television (142 in 1968, 919 in 1969, and over 1,000 per year for every subsequent year, as
shown in Online Appendix Figure C.5). Online Appendix Figure C.6 illustrates the relative
prevalence of the various categories of television advertisements (e.g., 31% of all advertise-
ments broadcast on television in 1971 were about food or non-alcoholic drinks).
Newspapers To compare the advertisements broadcast on television with those published
in newspapers, we similarly classify all the advertisements published in newspapers according
to the same 25 categories. Specifically, for a subset of newspapers (four national newspapers44
and five local newspapers45), we classify all the advertisements published in the newspaper
between 1964 and 1972. To do so, we use the same method as the one described above
regarding the quantity of advertising (i.e., we select the third week of March and third week of
December). In addition, we classify each newspaper advertisement as either local or national.
According to our findings, 24% of the advertisements found in national newspapers were
44France Soir, L’Aurore, Le Figaro, and Le Monde.
45La Liberte´ De Normandie, La Marseillaise, Le Maine Libre, Le Me´ridional, and Le Midi Libre.
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local advertisements, whereas 44% of the advertisements found in local newspapers were local
advertisements.46 Online Appendix Figure C.7 illustrates the relative prevalence of the various
categories of advertisements in both local and national newspapers in 1967 and 1971. The
figures are built so that the categories correspond to those for TV.
4.3.2 Anecdotal evidence
The introduction of advertising on television likely has had an effect on both the intensive
and the extensive margins of the advertising side of the newspaper industry (i.e., on the
infra-marginal and marginal advertisers). On the intensive margin, the introduction of a new
advertising platform may have led to a reduction in the willingness to pay of many advertisers,
for instance, those who opt to advertise through both media. On the extensive margin, it
may have induced a number of advertisers to advertise exclusively on television. We use
the information collected on the nature of advertisements to anecdotally document an effect
on the extensive margin for national newspapers. Between 1964 and 1972, this substitution
pattern appears clearly, as illustrated in Figure 4 for electronic devices and OTC drugs.
Between 1966 and 1971, national newspapers reduced drastically the share of “clothing” and
“house electrical goods” advertisements they published (Figures C.7a and C.7b), which were
significant sources of advertisements broadcast on television (see Figure C.6). By contrast,
they published more “leisure” advertisements. In the next section, we provide econometric
evidence of a decrease in advertising prices and revenues, which may be due to the effect on
both the intensive and extensive margins.
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
4.4 No change in the quality of television content
Although the reform introduced only a few minutes of advertising per day (and is thus unlikely
to have directly affected preferences in a significant manner), one may be concerned that the
extra revenues generated through advertising were used to increase the quality of television
programming and induce newspaper readers to stop reading. Naturally, we are not claiming
the quality of television was not improving over time. However, what matters for our purposes
is that existing trends in television quality did not change around 1967-1968 as a result of
the reform. In addition to noting that the officially stated reason for the reform was to help
the state-owned television agency remain financially viable and to introduce a third channel
a few years later, we collected information on three different and complementary measures
of television quality from various ORTF reports (the sources are described in the Online
46These estimates are consistent with existing aggregate data on revenues: according to IREP, the share of
local advertisements in advertising revenues of local daily newspapers was equal to 43% in 1967.
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Appendix). Specifically, we collected information on (i) the number of transmitters and their
power/reach, (ii) the number of hours of content produced and broadcast (including news
reports), and (iii) the number of journalists employed by the ORTF.
Figure 5 presents our results. The number of transmitters (results are similar if we focus
on their power) gradually increased during the time period, but without any shock around
the introduction of advertising on television (the increase in 1972 is due to the creation of the
third channel). The number of hours of programming broadcast is flat for the 1st channel
during our period of interest (if anything, it slightly decreased at the end of the 60’s), and
increased linearly on the 2nd channel. There was no change in the number of hours of
news broadcast. Finally, the number of journalists working for the ORTF increased linearly
throughout our period (with perhaps a slightly more rapid increase starting in 1970, due to
the introduction of the third channel). This last measure is particularly important, given that
we proxy newspapers’ quality with the size of their newsroom.47
We also show the total number of license-fees collected on all television set owners from
1962 to 1974. There exists a linear trend that does not vary around the introduction of
advertising on television.
Finally, although the first programs in color were broadcast on French television in 1967,
this likely had a negligible impact on preferences around the time of the shock. Only a
tiny share of French households were equipped with adequate TV sets initially, for instance,
386,026 households had such equipment in 1971 (i.e., less than 4% of households owning a
television). Moreover, programs in color represented only a small share of total programming
(e.g., less than five minutes per day in 1969).
Clearly, though, quality can come in various forms and we cannot claim to capture all
relevant dimensions. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that for the observed measures of quality
we have, there is no sudden change occuring in 1967-1968. Similarly, it also seems unlikely
that improvements in quality (if any) would have affected differentially readers of national
and local newspapers. Overall, therefore, the introduction of advertising on French television
provides us with a unique empirical setting in which to study the consequences of a negative
shock to the newspaper industry that plausibly affected in a direct manner only the advertising
side of the market.48
47Only a very small share of the journalists working for the ORTF were previously working for local or
national daily newspapers. Using data from Cage´ (2016) as well as additional information we collected for
this paper, we have documented the professional origin of the journalists working for the ORTF in 1974. As
illustrated in the online Appendix Figure C.8, 49% of them obtained their first job as a journalist at the ORTF,
and 22% were already working for the ORTF in 1960 (at the beginning of our period of interest). Out of the
1,120 journalists working for the agency in 1974, only 62 were previously working for a local daily newspaper,
and 32 for a national daily newspaper (i.e., 2.9%).
48By contrast, the introduction of an ad-financed television channel would affect both sides of the market
(readers and advertisers), thereby making it more difficult to establish the causal relationship between ad-
vertising revenues and newspapers’ quality and pricing choices. See Seamans and Zhu (2014) for a similar
approach.
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[FIGURE 5 HERE]
5 Empirical analysis
The model we built in Section 2 provides us with a framework with which to think about the
determinants of newspapers’ choices regarding the size of their newsroom (or production of
journalistic-intensive content), their pricing, and the composition of their readership. Noting
that in our dataset newspapers sell their content both to subscribers and occasional readers,
in the Online Appendix, we also model newspapers’ incentives to charge different prices to
different groups of readers. In this section, we study empirically how these various choices
and outcomes are affected by newspapers’ reliance on advertising revenues. To the best of
our knowledge, our paper is the first to use this quasi-natural experiment.
5.1 Estimation strategy
We use our panel data to compute DiD estimates of the effect of the introduction of advertising
on television. Our identifying assumption is that the negative shock on advertising revenues
has affected mostly national daily newspapers and to a lower extent local daily newspapers.
We take advantage of the treatment heterogeneity and use national newspapers as our “treated
group” and local newspapers as our “control group.” We then compare the pre-1967-to-post-
1967 change in the variables of interest of national daily newspapers to the change in the same
variables of interest of local daily newspapers over the same period. Note that because local
newspapers may also have suffered from the shock (albeit to a lower extent), our estimates
are a lower bound. Finally, we also assume that the introduction of television advertising
constituted a direct shock only the advertising side of the newspaper industry.
Let Dnational news be an indicator variable for national newspapers and Dafter be a time
dummy that switches on for observations post 1967 (i.e., the year the reform is announced).
Our analysis is based on the following regression equation:
yn,t = α+ β1 (Dafter ∗Dnational news) + λn + γt + n,t (1′)
where n indexes newspapers and t indexes years (t = 1960, ...1974). For all specifications in our
analysis, we introduce fixed effects for newspaper (λn) as well as time dummies (γt).
49 This
approach prevents cross-sectional variations from driving our results. n,t is a newspaper-year
shock. Standard errors are clustered at the newspaper level.
yn,t is our outcome of interest. In all the specifications, we use the logarithms of the de-
pendent variable. We first investigate the effect of the introduction of advertising on television
49Note that we do not introduce the Dnational news and the Dafter indicator variables separately given that
their effect is captured by the newspaper and time fixed effects.
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on the advertising side of the market – advertising revenues, price, and quantity –, then turn
to prices on the reader side and finally consider content and size of the newsroom choices.
Due to the inclusion of newspaper and year fixed effects, the coefficient β1 – our coefficient
of interest – measures the annual effect for national newspapers of the introduction of ad-
vertising on television compared to the general evolution of our dependent variable (e.g. the
number of journalists) for local newspapers. The key identifying assumption here is that the
trends of the dependent variables would be the same for both categories of newspapers (local
and national) in the absence of the treatment. The treatment induces a deviation from this
common trend. We present econometric evidence in support of the parallel trend assumption
below.
Finally, the unbiasedness of the DiD estimates requires the strict exogeneity of the intro-
duction of advertising on television. As we underline above, French television was state-owned
from 1945 to 1981. Therefore, no interaction occurred between television owners and news-
paper owners, whether national or local. The French government unilaterally decided to
introduce advertising on television to answer the concerns of the ORTF. This decision is
exogenous to the newspaper industry.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Effect on the advertising side of the market
Our identifying assumption is that the introduction of advertising on television was a negative
shock to advertising revenues that affected national daily newspapers more severely than local
daily newspapers. Table 3 reports estimates of equation (1′). Our outcomes of interest are
advertising revenues (column 1), prices (columns 2 and 3) and quantity (column 4).
We find the shock leads to a 24% decrease in the advertising revenues of national news-
papers compared to the revenues of local newspapers. The decrease in advertising revenues
is driven by the fall in the price of advertising. We obtain a 14% decrease following the shock
when we use the total advertising revenues normalized by circulation (column 2); the decrease
is stronger when we consider the list price measure of advertising prices (column 3). However,
we find no statistically significant change in the quantity of advertising.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
5.2.2 Effect on the reader side of the market
We analyze how the shock to advertising revenues affected newspapers’ pricing choices and
their circulation. Table 4 presents the results. We find a 11% decrease in the subscription
price of national newspapers compared to the subscription price of local newspapers following
the introduction of advertising on television. This decrease is statistically significant at the 1%
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level. We find no statistically significant change in the unit price. Therefore, national news-
papers increased the extent of price discrimination (as measured by the price gap) following
the shock.
Regarding total circulation, it remained unchanged, but we obtain a statistically significant
increase in the share of subscribers, which went up by 23%. Finally, revenues from sales
decrease (by 13%) following the shock.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
5.2.3 Effect on “quality”
Two features of newspapers have been repeatedly used in the literature as measures of newspa-
per quality (or at least production of journalistic-intensive content): the number of journalists
and the so-called newshole (the amount of space in the newspaper devoted to anything but
advertising) (see e.g., Hamilton, 2004; Berry and Waldfogel, 2010; Fan, 2013; Cage´, 2017;
Cage´ et al., 2017).50 Anderson and Waldfogel (2015) for instance note that “(i)n newspapers,
some of the direct input cost measures – page length and staff size – are directly suggestive of
quality.” Table 5 presents estimates of the impact of the shock on these two measures, as well
as on the average payroll and the total number of pages.
We show that the introduction of advertising on television leads to a 21% decrease in
the number of journalists (column 1). We find no effect on the average payroll (column 2).
This may be due to the fact that the relative reduction in the size of the newsroom impacted
all the journalists, regardless of their experience. However, this result has to be interpreted
cautiously given that the non-significance of the estimate may also be due to a lack of power
(our coverage is lower for the payroll than for the total number of journalists, hence the lower
number of observations).
In addition, we obtain no statistically significant change in the number of pages (column 3)
or in the newshole (column 4), our alternative measure of quality (see, e.g., Gentzkow et al.,
2006, who use both the number of stories and the size of the stories as measures of news
quality). This absence of change in the newshole, for a given number of pages, is consistent
with the absence of change in the amount of space devoted to advertising we obtain above.
Obviously, measuring quality is not straightforward, and news quality may encompass
other dimensions we are not capturing here.51 Nevertheless, the fact that newspapers would
choose to produce the same newshole with significantly fewer journalists is suggestive of a de-
50When controlling for measures of newspaper quality, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) similarly use the number
of pages in the paper as well as the number of journalists.
51For example, unlike Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010), we do not have information regarding the number
of prizes won by newspapers. Neither do we have information on newspaper reputation or slant, although
research has shown consumers tend to rate the quality of news outlets whose slant matches their own views
higher (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006, 2008).
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crease in the amount of original journalistic-intensive content produced (for instance, through
a switch towards more soft news52). In column 5, we provide some suggestive evidence of
a decrease in the share of hard news produced by national newspapers compared to local
newspapers after the introduction of advertising on television.53 This evidence should be
interpreted with caution: it is statistically significant at the 10% level and the number of ob-
servations is low (we only have data for 37 local daily newspapers and 10 national newspapers
from 1964 to 1972). Moreover, to compute the share of hard news, we relied exclusively on
front pages (as opposed to newspapers’ full issues). Nevertheless, we find it reassuring that
this suggestive evidence regarding hard vs. soft news is consistent with the observed drop in
the size of the newsroom.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
5.2.4 Effect on readership
Finally, we study the extent to which the drop in advertising revenues affected the composition
of readership. To do so, we use the readership data described above. This data is available
for only 38 newspapers (but for all national newspapers), and results should thus simply be
considered as suggestive. Table 6 presents the results. Following the collapse in advertising
revenues and readjustment of content and prices, national newspapers seem to have switched
to a less educated and aﬄuent readership relative to local newspapers, with fewer educated
readers and white-collars workers and more blue-collar workers and farmers. (Note that the
magnitude of the point estimates is higher than in the other tables. Because the outcome
variable is here a percentage – e.g., the share of readers with tertiary education – we use the
level rather than the logarithm of the outcome variable in the estimation.)
[TABLE 6 HERE]
5.2.5 Heterogeneity of effects and reliance on advertising revenues
All national newspapers were not relying on advertising revenues to the same extent in the
first half of the 1960s. Hence, we should not expect them to have been affected in the
same way by the introduction of advertising on television. In particular, the shock should
52According to Bennett (1983), “serious political news costs more to report because it often requires the time
and initiative of experienced journalists who know who to call, what to ask, and where to follow the leads. Soft
news often requires no reporters at all, save perhaps sending a camera crew to shoot fires, floods, accidents,
and other disasters that can be scripted back at the studio.” In this article, we do not claim that producing soft
news does not require journalists but that it requires fewer journalists than producing hard news, consistent
with the existing literature (see e.g. Hamilton, 2004; Henry, 2007; Starkman, 2013; Hamilton, 2016; Cage´, 2017;
Cage´ et al., 2017). The lower cost of soft-news production partly comes from the fact that, as highlighted by
Baum (2002), part of this production happens through “repackaging news”.
53We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us to perform this content analysis.
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have been weaker for newspapers that were not depending a lot on advertising revenues,
while newspapers whose reliance was high should have experienced a greater shock. To test
whether this is the case, we split our sample of national newspapers between those that were
highly reliant on advertising revenues before the shock (in 1966) and those whose reliance
was lower.54 The threshold is simply defined using the median of the share of advertising
in total revenues in 1966 (we use the median to guarantee a sufficient number of national
daily newspapers in both categories). Table 7 presents the results. The “low” columns show
the effect of the introduction of advertising on television when we only considered national
daily newspapers whose reliance on advertising revenues in 1966 is below the median, and
the “high” columns this effect for the national daily newspapers whose reliance is above the
median (the control group consists of the same sample of local daily newspapers in all the
columns). With the exception of the subscription price, we find that the shock was stronger for
“high” national newspapers, i.e., national newspapers whose reliance on advertising revenues
was above the median in 1966, than for “low” newspapers. E.g., we observe a 24% decrease
in the number of journalists of the national daily newspapers highly reliant on advertising
revenues, compared to a 18% decrease in this number for national daily newspapers whose
reliance is lower. Moreover, for national newspapers highly reliant on advertising revenues,
we obtain a 10% decline in the newshole compared to local newspapers, and this decrease
is statistically significant at the 5% level. These results should be interpreted with caution
given the low number of national daily newspapers in each category, but they are consistent
with the empirical strategy we use in this paper that suggests a heterogeneous effect of the
introduction of advertising on television depending on the reliance on advertising before the
shock.
[TABLE 7 HERE]
5.3 Controlling for parallel trends
The before-after event study approach enables us to control for time-invariant newspaper-
specific effects and general time trends. As a validity check of our DiD identification strategy,
we present visually the coefficients of the following specification where we interact the year
fixed effects with the national newspapers indicator variable:
yn,t = α+
1974∑
t=1960
δt (γt ∗Dnational news) + λn + γt + n,t, (2′)
where 1960 is the base year and γt are as before year fixed effects. Figure 6 presents the
results for our outcome variables of interest.
54We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this test.
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We find no statistically significant effect (with a point estimate close to zero) for the
interaction between the year fixed effects and the national newspapers indicator variable
before the shock, whether we consider advertising revenues, advertising price, subscription
price, circulation, the number of journalists, the newshole, or the share of employees among
readers and the share of farmers and laborers among readers. This is reassuring as to the
validity of our DiD strategy. Moreover, as expected given the results of Tables 3, 4, and 5,
we show that the introduction of advertising did not affect newspapers’ circulation nor their
newshole. By contrast, we observe a decrease in both advertising revenues and the advertising
(listed) price, as well as in the subscription price. For all these variables, the shock is “on
impact” and lasts (at least) until 1974. Furthermore, we also find an increase in the share of
farmers and laborers as well as a decrease in the share of employees “on impact”. However,
given the lower number of observations for these variables, these results have to be interpreted
with caution.
Note that the drop in subscription and ad prices occurs the year of the policy announce-
ment (i.e., 1967). This is not surprising given (i) the ease with which newspapers can adjust
their prices and (ii) that there was uncertainty as to the immediacy of the reform when it
was announced. Presumably, the observed price adjustments also reflect the sudden and large
shock to advertisers’ willingness to pay for newspaper readers’ attention. Recall from Section
4.3 that the ORTF increased its advertising revenues by e82.3 million between 1967 and 1968
with the airing of only 184 minutes of advertising in total (by comparison, national newspa-
pers lost e49.5.3 million over the same period). Clearly, companies intent on advertising on
television (an entirely new platform) invested significant time and sums of money in the pro-
cess, and the e82.3 million of additional advertising revenues raised by the television agency
in 1968 are but a lower bound on the cost they must have incurred. This large investment
made by the advertising companies in the new platform, in turn, translated into a sudden and
significant negative shock to newspapers’ ad revenues, thereby also suggesting a somewhat
large degree of substitutability between the two advertising platforms.55
Finally, regarding the number of journalists, the relative decrease in the size of the news-
room becomes statistically significant only in 1968, and the magnitude of the effect becomes
stronger with time. The fact that employment decisions would take longer to materialize was
to expected given the rigidity of the French labor market.
[FIGURE 6 HERE]
55Recall from Section 4.3 that total television advertising revenues increase year after year as the daily
number of minutes of ads is gradually raised, but that average advertising revenues (per minute of advertising)
decrease over time, which may either reflect the fact that the first companies to advertise on television are those
with the highest willingness to pay for it or suggest the existence of negative externalities among advertisers.
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6 Interpretation, discussion, and robustness checks
6.1 Interpreting the results
The model developed in Section 2 highlighted how a drop in advertising revenues had the
potential to reduce the newspaper’s production of journalistic-intensive content and lead to a
less aﬄuent and educated readership. Our desire to carry out comparative statics limited the
generality of the model we could construct. In particular, it implied we could accommodate
only limited dimensions of heterogeneity of preferences. In this section, we interpret our
empirical findings in light of the predictions of our theoretical framework and, when necessary,
in light of possible extensions.56
The fall in advertising revenues and advertising prices is explained by the arrival of an
alternative advertising platform. Explaining our apparent absence of change in the quantity of
advertising despite the lower advertising prices is less straightforward. One possible rational-
ization is as follows. Suppose companies wishing to advertise not only value large readerships
but also exclusivity (i.e., they are willing to pay to prevent their rivals from advertising in
the same newspaper). Then, advertisers’ lower willingness to pay for exclusive access to read-
ers’ attention will lower the newspapers’ incentives to grant exclusivity, which may offset the
temptation to decrease the quantity of advertising that follows from lower prices.57
To continue, the decrease in the number of journalists employed by national newspapers
combined with the absence of change in the newshole imply a readjustment towards less
journalistic-intensive content. This finding suggests that national newspapers either decreased
the average quality of their stories – it took fewer journalists to produce them – and/or printed
fewer hard stories and more soft stories. In our empirical analysis we provided suggestive
evidence of the latter mechanism. A third possibility is that national newspapers chose to
rely more on wire services instead of producing their own original content, which, although
may not imply a fall in quality per se, would still raise questions about the industry’s ability
to produce diverse information.58 This decrease in the production of journalistic-intensive
content therefore lends support to our theoretical predictions. Providing quality or original
journalistic-intensive content is costly but has the potential to both increase the size of the
readership and/or attract readers who are more appealing to advertisers. When advertising
revenues decline, newspapers’ incentives to invest in news quality thus fall. Consistent with
this interpretation, we also provided empirical evidence suggestive of a readjustment towards
56The Appendix includes an extension in which we analyze the robustness of our predictions in a duopoly
setting. In the Online Appendix, we model journalistic-intensive content as quality and again derive a pos-
itive relationship between journalistic-intensive content and advertising revenues. Finally, we also allow the
newspaper to sell subscriptions in additions to individual issues in order to engage in second-degree price
discrimination.
57A simple model in which this effect is at play is available from the authors upon request.
58To the best of our understanding and our content analysis, unlike in the US, French newspapers relied on
wire services to obtain information and facts, not to print entire stories.
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a less aﬄuent and educated readership.
The fact that newspapers would react to lower advertising revenues by increasing the gap
between the unit price and the average subscription price is not difficult to rationalize. This
pricing readjustment could, for instance, reflect changes in the preferences of the average
marginal advertisers (see, e.g., Weyl, 2010). In the Online Appendix, we build a model in
which a newspaper can sell both subscriptions and individual issues. We then investigate the
relationship between the price gap and the reliance on advertising revenues. We show that a
drop in advertising revenues always increases the price gap.
Further, the fact that national newspapers would decrease their subscription price is strik-
ing. Indeed a robust prediction of two-sided models (with empirical support; see, e.g., Seamans
and Zhu, 2014) is that newspapers should react to lower advertising revenues by increasing
reader prices (the “waterbed” effect). In Section 2, we showed that newspapers had incentives
to reduce their production of journalistic-intensive content when faced with lower advertising
revenues, and that this change in content could translate into a lower subscription price. Co-
herent with this interpretation, as discussed above, we find empirical support for a decrease
in news quality (as measured by the size of the newsroom) and the adoption of a less aﬄuent
readership.
To continue, we find that newspapers’ changes in prices and content leave their total
number of units sold unaffected, but increase their share of subscribers. The latter finding is
consistent with the decrease in the subscription price and absence of change in the newsstand
price. The absence of change in the total number of units sold is seemingly at odds with our
theoretical predictions whereby newspapers have lower incentives to attract a large reader-
ship when advertising revenues decline. Given that advertisers likely cared not only about
the number of readers but also about their characteristics (e.g., their wealth), it is plausible
that newspapers reacted to the drop in advertising revenues by adopting a less aﬄuent but
potentially larger readership.59 Finally, we note that the increase in the share of subscribers
mechanically inflates the number of units sold reported (since the typical occasional reader
does not purchase every single issue of the newspaper). In case the probability that a sub-
scriber reads a given issue is lower than the probability that an occasional buyer reads a
purchased issue, an absence of change in total units sold actually implies a fall in the average
number of distinct readers.
59To be clear, we are not claiming that advertisers post-1967-68 targeted a less aﬄuent readership, but
rather that newspapers catered less to what advertisers desired. If advertisers targeted consumers belonging
to a (relatively) high income group, newspapers’ incentives to reach these readers must have been lower post
1967-68. Consistent with this view, it seems unlikely that the composition of newspaper advertisers changed
dramatically following the introduction of a few minutes of television advertising. This observation leads us
to think that the readjustment towards a less aﬄuent readership is not driven by changes in ad-targeting.
Unfortunately, the information we gathered concerning newspaper ads does not allow us to test the validity of
this hypothesis directly.
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6.2 Discussion
6.2.1 Comparability of national and local newspaper markets
Both the national newspaper market and the average local newspaper market are oligopolies,
which is reassuring as to the comparability of both segments. However, one may be concerned
that these two segments still differ in their degree of competition, which may potentially bias
our results given that local newspapers were also affected by the introduction of advertising on
television (albeit to a much lesser extent). We address this issue in two ways. First, in Online
Appendix Table D.10 we show that our results are robust to dropping the few newspapers that
are in a monopolistic situation from 1960 to 1974, thereby making both segments more alike.60
Second, in Section 2, we built upon our theoretical framework to argue that the magnitudes of
the changes in reader prices and numbers of journalists should be lower in more competitive
markets, essentially because of greater market fragmentation. In practice, determining which
of the national or the average local newspaper market is more competitive is challenging. If,
as many believe, competition is overall more intense in the national newspaper segment (as,
for instance, suggested by national newspapers’ smaller operating margins), the resulting bias
would work against us and our findings would be under-estimates of the real effects.
6.2.2 Subsidies
During our period, daily newspapers were subsidized through reduced VAT rates, subsidized
paper prices (also through a reduced VAT rate), and reduced rates for transport services
provided by the state postal and train agencies. These subsidies applied indiscriminately
under the same terms to all local and national newspapers until 1973, independently of their
political orientation, profitability, etc.
Given that the same VAT rates and paper prices applied to both local and daily newspa-
pers, we are not concerned about threats to our identification strategy. However, although
both local and national newspapers relied on postal services to deliver subscriptions, only
national newspapers needed transportation by train to ship newspapers from their printing
facilities in Paris to provincial towns. One may thus be concerned about differential trends
in postage and train rates. To address this concern, we collected annual data on postage and
train rates from an annual industry publication. Details regarding the data and sources are
provided in the Online Appendix Section B.
Figure C.9 shows the evolution of postage and train rates from 1963 to 1974. The evolution
of both rates suggests that, if anything, from a costs perspective, adopting a subscriber-
based readership must have become less tempting to national newspapers relative to local
60La Nouvelle Re´publique Du Centre Ouest and Ouest France were monopolies in the counties where their
headquarters were located.
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newspapers after 1967.
The French government introduced subsidies to newspapers with low advertising revenues
and/or a low circulation in 1973. We do not have information on the recipients of these direct
subsidies. However, as we explain below, in Table D.3 in the Online Appendix we show that
our results are robust to focusing on the 1960-1971 period.
6.2.3 External Validity
Our analysis relied on French data and an event that occurred some fifty years ago, and may
thus raise concerns about our ability to shed light on today’s trends. Could it be that the
French newspaper industry is unique in some fundamental ways? Or could it be that the
industry’s current migration online has entirely changed the economics of journalism?
The print newspaper industry –which, although in decline, still represents a sizable share
of the news media industry61 – is similar across Western countries. The distinction between
national newspapers and local newspapers is ubiquitous. Although the number of national
newspapers in France may seem high in comparison to the US, it is equivalent to that found,
for instance, in the UK or Italy.62 Everywhere the reliance on advertising revenues is signif-
icant, and everywhere advertising revenues are in decline. Further, the ability to purchase
newspapers via subscriptions or at newsstands is also common across countries.63 Finally,
although subsidies are perhaps more prevalent in France than elsewhere, fortunately for us,
the types of subsidies that may make the French newspaper industry distinct in some respects
are introduced only at the very end of our period of interest (see above).
Undoubtedly, the migration online of news companies has led to significant changes in
the market for news. Though a large number of journalists have become independent, we
take the view that the need to share resources, develop a brand/reputation, the gains from
specialization, and the returns from the bundling of diversified content, all suggest that news
companies are unlikely to disappear in the years to come. If anything, the decrease in fixed and
marginal costs brought about by the Internet has increased the number of news companies.
This increase in competition for consumers has made it harder for online news companies to
charge for their content, which exacerbates their reliance on advertising revenues to finance
journalism and thus magnifies the mechanisms we have highlighted in this paper.
61For instance, the Pew Research Center reports in its 2016 State of the News Media report that 51% of
americans who read a newspaper read it exclusively in print.
62There were 10 national newspapers circulating in 2016 in the UK: Daily Express, Daily Mirror, Financial
Times, Independent, Times, Daily Mail, Daily Star, Guardian, The Sun, and Telegraph. There were 9 national
newspapers circulating in Italy in 2017: Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica, La Stampa, Il Sole 24 Ore, Il
Messaggero, La Nazione, Il Fatto Quotidiano, Il Tempo, and Il Manifesto.
63One difference between the US and France is the former’s relatively high share of subscribers, which, we
conjecture, may be due to the larger share of population living in suburbs.
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6.3 Robustness
We perform several robustness checks. This section briefly describes them; the detailed results
for these tests are available in the Online Appendix.
Bootstrap The low number of national newspapers may be a potential threat to our empiri-
cal estimation given the supposedly high degree of auto-correlation in the considered outcomes
variables. To deal with this issue, we show that our results are robust to using bootstrap stan-
dard errors. Online Appendix Table D.1 presents the results. Our estimates are robust to
accounting for autocorrelation.
Dropping 1968 1968 was a troubled year in France, with a period of civil unrest, demon-
strations, and numerous strikes. We show our results are robust to dropping this year from
our sample of analysis (Online Appendix D.2).
Focusing on 1960-1971 As we highlighted in Section 4, a third television channel was
introduced in 1972. This additional channel may have affected readers’ preferences. In the
Online Appendix Table D.3, we show that our results are robust to focusing our analysis on
the 1960-1971 period. All our results hold despite the lower number of observations, except
for the change in the subscription price which is no longer statistically significant. The effect
on the number of journalists is still statistically significant at the 1% level: the number of
journalists employed by national newspapers now decreases by 15% compared to that of local
newspapers. The relatively lower magnitude of the effect (compared to the 21% estimation
in Table 5) was to be expected given that hiring/firing decisions in France are rather rigid.
Moreover, our results are equally robust to reducing even further the historical window used
to capture the effect of the introduction of advertising on television, and this despite a much
lower number of observations. If we focus on the 1964-1971 period (i.e., the years during
which both and only the first and the second television channels were broadcasting) our
results remain unchanged (Online Appendix Table D.4).
Dropping Paris Jour and Paris Presse As highlighted in Section 3.1, two daily na-
tional newspapers, Paris Jour and Paris Presse, exit during our period of interest (in 1972
and 1970, respectively). In the Online Appendix D.5, we show that our results are robust to
dropping these two national newspapers. If anything, the increase in the share of subscribers
is stronger.64
64More generally, our results are robust to dropping any national newspaper. No particular national news-
paper drives our results.
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Industry-specific time trend As an additional robustness check, we show that our results
are robust to controlling for industry-specific time trends. Specifically, we estimate:
yn,t =α+ β1 (Dafter ∗Dnational news) + µ1nationalt+ λn + γt + n,t, (3′)
where µ1nationalt is a national newspapers industry-specific trend coefficient multiplying the
time trend variable t. The introduction of these industry-specific time trends allows treatment
and control newspapers to follow different trends in a limited but potentially revealing way.
Online Appendix Table D.6 shows that our results are robust to adding this control.
Large regional newspapers A number of local daily newspapers in our dataset can be
considered as “regional” newspapers because they circulate across many counties. Specifi-
cally, on average, local daily newspapers circulate across more than 3 counties and across 1.7
regions.65 However, these numbers are driven by a few outliers: the median number of regions
across which local newspapers circulate is 1. Only 6 newspapers circulate across more than
3 regions during our period of interest: Centre Presse, Le Dauphine´ Libe´re´, La De´peˆche Du
Midi, L’Echo Du Centre, La Montagne, and La Tribune Le Progre`s. Online Appendix Table
D.7 shows that our estimates are robust to dropping these large regional newspapers.
Weighting newspapers by their circulation In the main analysis, we gave each news-
paper the same weight in the regressions. As appears clearly in the summary statistics table,
some newspapers are much larger than others. As an additional robustness check, we recom-
pute our estimates by weighting newspapers with their circulation at the beginning of our
period. Table D.8 presents the results. Our main findings are unaffected by this alternative
approach. Moreover, the decline in the newshole is now statistically significant, but only at
the 10% level.
Balanced Sample Finally, in the main analysis, the number of observations varies de-
pending on the dependent variables under consideration. This is due to the fact that for some
newspapers-years there are missing values for some dependent variables but not others (this
occurs because we have used different data sources for different dependent variables). As a
robustness check, we recomputed our estimates on a sample that has every dependent variable
non-missing. Online Appendix Table E.9 presents the results. Despite the lower number of
observations (695), our main findings are unaffected by this alternative specification, to the
exception of the increase in the share of subscribers (but the effect on the share of subscribers
is only statistically significant at the 10% level in our main specification). In particular, we
65A region is a French territorial administrative unit that comprised a little over 4 counties (de´partements)
on average during our period of interest.
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find a 41% decrease in the advertising price, a 13% decrease in the subscription price, and
a 17% decrease in the number of journalists employed by national newspapers compared to
that of local newspapers, all statistically significant at the 1% level.
7 Conclusion
The newspaper industry is in the midst of a severe crisis. A factor often invoked to explain this
state of distress is the strong drop in advertising revenues legacy newspapers have experienced
following the advent of the Internet. Concomitant to this decrease in advertising revenues, the
industry’s business model is evolving with, among other changes, a tendency for newspapers
to reduce the size of their newsroom. In this paper, we build a model in which a monopoly
newspaper extracts revenues both from readers and advertisers. The newspaper chooses the
size of its newsroom /quality of its content, and readers are heterogeneous in the relative
amount of journalistic-intensive content they prefer. We show that a drop in advertising
revenues induces the newspaper to lower the quality of its content, which, concurrent with a
decrease in the subscription price, changes the composition of the readership.
These predictions are consistent with the empirical evidence we obtain using data on the
French daily newspaper industry between 1960 and 1974. Using novel annual data and the
introduction of advertising on television, we compare the pre- to-post-advertising on television
change in advertising revenues of national daily newspapers to the change in advertising
revenues of local daily newspapers. We find the introduction of advertising on television leads
to a decrease in advertising revenues of national newspapers compared to local newspapers.
This shock propagates to the reader side of the newspaper market with a fall in the subscription
price. We also show the introduction of advertising on television leads to a sharp decrease in
the number of journalists employed, but no change in the quantity of news. We infer from
these findings that national newspapers reacted to the drop in advertising revenues either by
decreasing the quality of their content or by producing fewer hard news. In the course of the
analysis, we provided evidence suggestive of the latter mechanism.
The impact of the Internet on advertising markets for news media is receiving increasing
attention (see, e.g., Athey et al., 2013). However, despite the intrinsic policy importance
of the news industry, empirical evidence regarding the consequences of declining advertising
revenues on the pricing and quality choices of the media is scant. Although our empirical
strategy exploits a moment in French history that ended 50 years ago, our findings have clear
relevance and implications for the 21st-century media industry. They suggest media outlets
will have lower incentives to invest in journalism if advertising revenues are to continue to
decline. Our results also point toward an increasingly subscriber-based readership.
In addition to reducing advertisers’ willingness to pay for newspaper readers’ attention,
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the Internet has also altered the media industry’s structure in other ways, for instance, with
the introduction of targeted advertising technologies (Athey and Gans, 2010), with increasing
consumer switching between media platforms (Athey et al., 2013), and with an increasing
ability for rival news outlets to appropriate stories (Cage´ et al., 2017). Exploiting the in-
troduction of advertising on French television helps us isolate the consequences of a decline
in advertisers’ willingness to pay for readers’ attention from the consequences of these other
powerful changes, thereby shedding light on a number of important mechanisms at play.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Proof We first derive the conditions stated in the main body that ensure 0 ≤ pR, 0 ≤ pA,
0 ≤ q ≤ 1, 0 < x˜l, x˜r < 1 , 0 ≤ dR
(
pR, q
) ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ dA (pR, pA, q) ≤ 1. One verifies
pR ≥ 0 if and only if
γ ≥ max
[
1
4
(
2 + α2 +
√
20 + 4α2 + α4
)
,
1
2
(
α2 +
√
4 + α4
)]
. (11)
If (11) holds, then it is also the case that 0 ≤ pA and 0 ≤ q. (11) also implies 0 < x˜l =
γ+1
2γ2−2−(2+α2)γ . To ensure x˜r =
3γ+1
2γ2−2−(2+α2)γ  < 1, we also require
 <
2γ2 − 2− (2 + α2) γ
3γ + 1
, (12)
which implies q ≤ 1. The right-hand side of (12) is positive because of (11). Finally, (11),
0 < x˜l, and x˜r < 1 jointly imply 0 < d
R
(
pR, q
)
= 2γ
2γ2−2−(2+α2)γ  < 1.
Substituting the solution stated in Proposition 1 into dA
(
pR, pA, q
)
yields
dA
(
pR, pA, q
)
=
αγ
2γ2 − 2− (2 + α2) γ . (13)
Condition (11) implies dA
(
pR, pA, q
)
is positive. To ensure dA
(
pR, pA, q
)
< 1, we also require
 <
2γ2 − 2− (2 + α2) γ
αγ
. (14)
Finally, our maintained assumption α <
√
2 implies 3γ + 1 > αγ, so that (12) implies (14).
We conclude the proof by verifying that the objective function (6) is strictly concave in(
pR, pA, q
)
. The Hessian matrix H associated to (6) is given by
∂2Π
∂pR∂pR
∂2Π
∂pR∂pA
∂2Π
∂pR∂q
∂2Π
∂pA∂pR
∂2Π
∂pAS∂pA
∂2Π
∂pA∂q
∂2Π
∂q∂pR
∂2Π
∂q∂pA
∂2Π
∂q∂q
 =

− 4γ
γ2−1 − 2αγγ2−1 2γγ2−1
− 2αγ
γ2−1 −2 2αγγ2−1
2γ
γ2−1
2αγ
γ2−1 −1

We verify H is negative definite. Because H is real and symmetric, it has three real
eigenvalues. To compute these eigenvalues, we solve for the polynomial P (λ) representing the
determinant of ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−2γˆ − λ −γˆα γˆ
−γˆα −2− λ γˆα
γˆ γˆα −1− λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣,
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where γˆ = 2γ
γ2−1 .
We obtain P (λ) = λ3− (3 + 2γˆ)λ2− (6γˆ + 2− 2α2γˆ2− γˆ2)λ− (4γˆ −α2γˆ2− 2γˆ2). Let λ1,
λ2, and λ3 denote the three real solutions of P (λ) = 0. By definition, these solutions are the
three eigenvalues of H. If all three eigenvalues of H are positive, all coefficients in P (λ) must
either be positive or negative. One obtains that all coefficients are non-positive if and only if
γ > max
16 (1 + 2α2 +√37 + 4α2 + 4α2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
,
1
4
(
2 + α2 +
√
20 + 4α2 + α4
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
II

One verifies II > I if and only if α <
√
2, which we have assumed throughout. To conclude,
therefore, expression (6) is strictly concave in
(
pR, pA, q
)
if and only if γ > II.
Last, one also shows that α <
√
2 implies both 1 +
√
2 > II and 1 +
√
2 > α
2+
√
4+α4
2 , so
that the case in which ∂∂αp
R > 0 (i.e., γ ∈
[
max[II, α
2+
√
4+α4
2 ], 1 +
√
2
]
) exists.
A.2 Competition
We here sketch the duopoly version of the model presented in Section 2. There are two
newspapers: N1 and N2. Each newspaper Ni (i = 1, 2) chooses
(
pRi , qi
)
. For simplicity, the
marginal advertising revenue is constant and equal to α > 0. Also, readers do not “multi-
home:” they only purchase a single newspaper. Finally, to shorten expressions and ensure
concavity of the newspapers’ optimization problems we set γ = 4 and assume the cost function
is equal to 4q2. The rest of the setting is identical to that of Section 2.
To help intuition, we focus on the feasible market configuration that is closest to the
monopoly benchmark. In the market configuration of interest, q1 < q2, that is, N1 chooses
a smaller newsroom than N2. Moreover, the market is not covered to the right of q2: the
readers with the highest ideal content do not make a purchase.66
We solve the model by assuming that newspapers choose their content in a first stage,
observe each other’s choice, and subsequently select their prices in a second stage. To ensure
that all quantities satisfy the model’s restrictions we impose α+  ≤ 14 .67
The reader indifferent between the two newspapers, denoted x˜, is found by rearranging:
+ x˜− 4 (x˜− q1)− pR1 = + x˜− 4 (q2 − x˜)− pR2 , (15)
which yields x˜ = 18 (4 (q1 + q2) + p2 − p1). We solve the model by backward induction. In the
66In the duopoly version of the model there does not exist a market configuration in which readers with a
low ideal content q are not served. This occurs because competition with N2 to attract readers is such that
N1’s incentives to raise its demand through an increase in q1 are lower than in the monopoly case.
67Computations are available upon request.
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second stage, N1 chooses p1 to maximize:
Π1
(
pR1 , p
R
2 , q1, q2
)
=
(
pR1 + α
)
x˜− 4q21, (16)
and N2 chooses p2 to maximize:
Π2
(
pR1 , p
R
2 , q1, q2
)
=
(
pR2 + α
)
(x˜r − x˜)− 4q22, (17)
where the expression for x˜r can be found in Section 2. Solving the corresponding system of
first-order conditions yields:
pR1 =
1
41
(8− 33α+ 76q1 + 108q2) pR2 =
1
41
(16− 12q1 − 25α+ 52q2) . (18)
Substituting these prices in (16) and (17), we solve for the first stage of the game (i.e., the
content choices). The corresponding computations yield
q1 =
389
15988
(α+ ) q2 =
20735
303772
(α+ ) . (19)
Consistent with the market configuration, 1 > q2 > q1. Moreover,
∂(q2−q1)
∂α > 0, that
is, an increase in advertising revenues leads to greater content differentiation. Finally, one
also shows p2 > p1, that is, the newspaper which produces the greater share of journalistic-
intensive content is able to charge a higher price to readers (because its residual demand is
less price-elastic). Finally, one also shows Π2 > Π1: the newspaper with the larger newsroom
enjoys higher profits in equilibrium.68
Straightforward computations lead to the following comparative statics.
Empirical Predictions In a duopoly market, a decrease in advertising revenues lowers:
1. the average size of the newsroom 12 (q1 + q2),
2. the average price 12
(
pR1 + p
R
2
)
, and
3. the average reader’s ideal content x˜r2 .
These comparative statics are reassuring as to the robustness of the benchmark model’s
predictions.
68To show this market configuration, prices, and content choices constitute an equilibrium, we also show no
company has an incentive to deviate in the first stage (e.g., N1 choosing q1 > q2). Computations are available
upon request.
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Newspapers' advertising revenues
Number of daily newspaper journalists
Notes: This figure represents the evolution of newspaper advertising revenues in dollars (blue square, left axis) and of
the number of daily newspaper journalists (red dots, rigth axis) in the United States between 1980 and 2015. Data on
newspaper revenues are from the Newspaper Association of America (NAA). Data on the number of journalists are from
the American Society of News Editors.
Figure 1: Newspaper advertising revenues (in dollars) and number of journalists in the United
States, 1980-2015
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Notes: The figure shows for 1967 and 1974 the value of advertising revenues in France by media outlets (local and
national daily newspapers, and television) in million (constant 2014) euros. Data are from the “Institut de Recherches
et d’Etudes Publicitaires” (IREP), a French research institute devoted to the study of advertising.
Figure 2: Advertising revenues by media outlets, 1967 & 1974
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Notes: The figure shows for 1967 and 1974 the share of total advertising revenues by media outlets (national daily
newspapers, local daily newspapers, magazines, television, radio, cinema, outdoor, and others). Data are from the
“Institut de Recherches et d’Etudes Publicitaires” (IREP), a French research institute devoted to the study of advertising.
Figure 3: Share of total advertising revenues by media outlets, 1967 & 1974
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Figure 4: Anecdotal evidence: Advertisements in national newspapers and on television
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1972: introduction of 3rd channel
0
50
100
150
200
250
Nu
m
be
r o
f t
ra
ns
m
itte
rs
196
2
196
3
196
4
196
5
196
6
196
7
196
8
196
9
197
0
197
1
197
2
197
3
197
4
All Channel 1
Channel 2 Channel 3
(a) Number of transmitters
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
Po
we
r o
f t
ra
ns
m
itte
rs
 (k
ilo
wa
tt)
196
2
196
3
196
4
196
5
196
6
196
7
196
8
196
9
197
0
197
1
197
2
197
3
197
4
All Channel 1
Channel 2 Channel 3
(b) Power of transmitters
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
Nu
m
be
r o
f h
ou
rs
 b
ro
ad
ca
st
196
2
196
3
196
4
196
5
196
6
196
7
196
8
196
9
197
0
197
1
1st channel All News
2nd channel All News
(c) Number of hours broadcast
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Nu
m
be
r o
f li
ce
ns
e-
fe
es
 (m
illi
on
)
196
2
196
3
196
4
196
5
196
6
196
7
196
8
196
9
197
0
197
1
197
2
197
3
197
4
(d) License-fees
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
Nu
m
be
r o
f jo
ur
na
lis
ts
196
0
196
1
196
2
196
3
196
4
196
5
196
6
196
7
196
8
196
9
197
0
197
1
197
2
197
3
197
4
(e) Number of journalists
Notes: The figure shows the evolution of four different measures of television quality from 1962 to 1974: the number
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Figure 5: Measures of television quality: no change around 1967
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(e) Number of journalists
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(f) News hole
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(g) Readership: % employees
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(h) Readership: % farmers & laborers
Notes: The figure shows the coefficients from the following estimation: yn,t = α +
∑1974
t=1960 δt (γt ∗Dnational news) +
λn + γt + n,t. 1960 is the base error except for Figure 6b given that listed price data is not available in 1960 and 1961.
Standard errors are clustered at the newspaper level. Statistical significance is measured at the 10% level.
Figure 6: Controlling for parallel trends
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